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NOTES AND COMMENTS
tried by court-martial for offenses committed while he was in uniform.2 6
However, military jurisdiction is not lost when the serviceman im-
mediately re-enlists2 7 or retains an inactive reserve status.28  Civilian
dependents accompanying the armed forces abroad may not be subjected
to a military trial in peace time when charged with a capital crime.29
Whether this reasoning will be applied in civilian dependent non-capital
cases remains to be seen. However, a civilian employed by the armed
services abroad is deemed to have military status and consequently is
amenable to military jurisdiction,30 even in capital cases.3' It will be
interesting to see if the Supreme Court agrees that civilian employees
and inactive reservists are in the land and naval forces for purposes of
military trial in peace time.
RiCHA1RD VON BIBERSTEIN, JR.
Constitutional Law-Police Power-Changed Economic Condition of
Railroads Judicially Applied in Determining Reasonableness of
Ordinance
The generally accepted test as to the constitutionality of an exercise
of the police power' is whether under all the existing conditions and
surrounding circumstances it is reasonable ;2 i.e., it must be reasonably
adapted to accomplish a legitimate end,3 be reasonable toward persons
whom it affects, 4 must not be for the annoyance of a particular class,5
nor be unduly oppressive.6  Reasonableness is a question of law for the
=' United States ex rel. Toth v. Quarles, 350 U.S. 11 (1955).
= United States v. Gallagher, 7 U.S.C.M.A. 506, 22 C.M.R. 296 (1957).
u8 Wheeler v. Reynolds, 164 F. Supp. 951 (N.D. Fla. 1958).
Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1 (1957).
United States ex rel. Guagliardo v. McElroy, 158 F. Supp. 171 (D.D.C.
1958) ; it re Varney's Petition, 141 F. Supp. 190 (S.D. Cal. 1956).
" Grisham v. Taylor, 161 F. Supp. 112 (M.D. Pa. 1958).
"Police power, although elusive of definition, has been defined as "the power
inherent in every sovereignty to govern men and things, under which power the
legislature may, within constitutional limits, not only prohibit all things hurtful
to the comfort, safety, and welfare of society, but may prescribe regulations to
promote the public health, morals, and safety, and add to the general public
convenience, prosperity, and welfare." 11 Am. JuR., Constitutional Law § 247
(1937).
' Austin v. Shaw, 235 N.C. 722, 71 S.E.2d 25 (1952); Berger v. Smith, 156
N.C. 323, 72 S.E. 376 (1911). It has been suggested, however, that an exercise
of the police power may be reasonable and yet unconstitutional. Soref, The
Doctrine of Reasonableness in the Pblice Power, 15 MA Q. L. Rzv. 3 (1930).
"It is necessary . . . that the proposed restriction have a reasonable and
substantial relation to the evil it purports to remedy." State v. Harris, 216 N.C.
746, 759, 6 S.E.2d 854, 863 (1940). See also East Side Levee and Sanitary Dist. v.
East St. Louis & C. Ry., 279 Ill. 123, 116 N.E. 720 (1917) ; Victory Cab Co. v.
Shaw, 232 N.C. 138, 59 S.E.2d 573 (1950).
'East Side Levee & Sanitary Dist. v. East St. Louis & C. Ry., supra note 3;
State v. Bass, 171 N.C. 780, 87 S.E. 972 (1916).
'Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896) ; Town of Clinton v. Standard Oil Co.,
193 N.C. 432, 137 S.E. 183 (1927).
' Plessy v. Ferguson, supra note 5.
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court,7 and is said to be based on human judgment, natural justice, and
common sense in view of all the facts and circumstances." The ap-
plication of the police power may vary as social, economic, and political
needs change ;9 therefore, what was once a proper exercise of such power
may later become arbitrary and unreasonable as a result of changed
conditions and circumstances. 10
Winston-Salem v. Southern Ry.11 is a recent North Carolina de-
cision wherein the foregoing principles were applied. In this case it
appeared that the plaintiff had been given power by its city charter12
to require any railroad company "at its own expense, to construct,
maintain and repair . . . crossings at grade, over or under its
streets . . . ."' Pursuant to this power, the Board of Aldermen of
Winston-Salem enacted an ordinance' 4 requiring the defendant to re-
build, at its entire expense, an existing trestle over a municipal street
so as to accommodate a proposed intracity thoroughfare which was to
cross the street under the trestle. Writ of mandamus' 5 was requested to
enforce the ordinance.
Defendant challenged the provisions of both the charter and the
ordinance on the ground that they were arbitrary, unreasonable, and
unconstitutional, and contended, inter alia, that the instant case was
factually distinguishable from the numerous cases cited by the plaintiff
'Durham v. Southern Ry., 185 N.C. 240, 117 S.E. 17 (1923).
'Bonnett v. Vallier, 136 Wis. 193, 116 N.W. 885 (1908).
1 Elizabeth City v. Aydlett, 201 N.C. 602, 161 S.E. 78 (1931) (police power
expands) ; State v. Lockey, 198 N.C. 551, 152 S.E. 693 (1930) ("The police power
is elastic, stretching out to meet the progress of the age.")
"It is more accurate to say, however, that the power itself remains the same,
and that its apparent extension is only the application of the principle on which
it is based to new conditions as they arise." State ex rel. Short v. Reidall, 109
Okla. 35, 39, 233 Pac. 684, 687 (1924) ; accord, Schmidt v. Board of Adjustment,
9 N.J. 405, 88 A.2d 607 (Sup. Ct. 1952).
" Nashville, C. & St. L. Ry. v. Walters, 294 U.S. 405 (1935) ("A statute valid
as to one set of facts may be invalid as to another.") ; Abie State Bank v. Bryan,
282 U.S. 765 (1931) (assessments under bank guaranty law); Chastleton Corp.
v. Sinclair, 264 U.S. 543 (1924) (post war rent controls) ; Atlantic Coast Line R.R.
v. Ivey, 148 Fla. 680, 5 So. 2d 244 (1941) (statute making railroads absolutely
liable for injury to livestock on unfenced track, and no such liability put on motor
vehicles) ; Realty Revenue Corp. v. Wilson, 181 Misc. 802, 44 N.Y.S.2d 234 (Sup.
Ct. 1943) (order requiring sprinkler systems in multiple dwellings held invalid
where material not obtainable due to war). See also Note, 40 CORNELL L.Q. 780
(1955).
Likewise, a once improper regulation may later become proper. Miller v.
Board of Pub. Works, 195 Cal. 477, 234 Pac. 381 (1925) (zoning laws) ; Elizabeth
City v. Aydlett, 201 N.C. 602, 161 S.E. 78 (1931) (zoning laws). For this
reason a few jurisdictions state that stare decisis has no application to the exercise
of police power. Schmitt v. F. W. Cook Brewing Co., 187 Ind. 623, 120 N.E.
19 (1918) ; State ex rel. George v. Aiken, 42 S.C. 222, 20 S.E. 221 (1894).11248 N.C. 637, 105 S.E.2d 37 (1958).
1 The General Assembly may delegate to a municipality a quantum of the
state's sovereign police power. Brewer v. Valk, 204 N.C. 186, 167 S.E. 638 (1933).
" N.C. Private Laws 1927, c. 232, § 54. ' Adopted April 15, 1957.
"As to mandamus being the proper remedy, see 2 ELLIOTT, RAILROADS § 1013
(4th ed. 1926), and cases there cited.
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in which similar statutes and ordinances were upheld.16 In support of
its position, defendant introduced into evidence special facts 1 7 tending
to show changed economic conditions unfavorable to the railroads. The
trial court, without reference to these special facts, granted mandamus.' 8
On appeal the supreme court reversed, holding that the ordinance (also
the provision of the charter) was unconstitutional, as applied to the
facts of the case, in that it was an unreasonable exercise of the police
power, depriving the defendant of its property without due process of
law in violation of the Constitution of North Carolina.' 9
" Where an ordinance, in the interest of public safety, convenience, or welfare,
requires the railroad to construct or reconstruct passageways over or above
streets and highways, whether existing at the time such passageway is constructed
or not, the majority view is that such an ordinance is valid as a reasonable exercise
of the police power. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. v. Public Util. Comm'n,
346 U.S. 346 (1953); Erie R.R. v. Board of Pub. Util. Comm'rs, 254 U.S. 394(1921) ; Chicago, Milwaukee & St. Paul Ry. v. Minneapolis, 232 U.S. 430 (1914) ;
Cincinnati, I. & W. Ry. v. City of Connersville, 218 U.S. 336 (1910). The theory
of these cases is that the public has a superior right to the safe and unimpeded
use of the streets and highways, that the railroad is obstructing such use, and that
the cost to the railroad is damnumn absque injuria, or deemed to be compensated
by the public benefit which the company is supposed to share. Erie R.R. v. Board
of Pub. Util. Comm'rs, supra; Missouri Pac. Ry. v. Omaha, 235 U.S. 121 (1914).
The great weight of authority refuses to recognize any distinction, as pertains
to railroad liability, between streets laid out previous to or subsequent to the
existence of the railroad track. 44 Am. JUR., Railroads § 297 (1942), and cases
there cited.
It is interesting to note that in State v. Wilmington & Weldon R.R., 74 N.C.
143 (1876), the railroad was not required to repair a bridge where such repairs
were made necessary by roads laid out subsequent to the existence of the railroad.
An opposite result was reached in Atlantic Coast Line R.R. v. Goldsboro, 155 N.C.
356, 71 S.E. 514 (1911), aff'd, 232 U.S. 548 (1914). Though it might be argued
that these variant decisions rest on differences in the respective charters, the
Goldsboro case, supra, quotes with approval the majority theory as found in
State ex rel. Minneapolis v. St. Paul, M. & M. Ry., 98 Minn. 380, 108 N.W. 261,
(1906), aff'd inem. 214 U.S. 497 (1909), viz., "A railroad . . . accepts . . . its
franchise subject to the implied right of the state to lay out and open new
streets and highways over its tracks, and must be deemed, as a matter of law, to
have had in contemplation at the time its charter was granted, and is bound to
assume, all burdens incident to new, as well as existing, crossings."
The principal case seems passively to accept the majority view.
"' The special facts are, in essence, the following:(1) Large-scale competition from trucks and public carriers has resulted in
economic hardship for railroads, and costs of trestle improvements cannot be
passed to the public by higher freight rates.(2) The City of Winston-Salem has at its disposal, for street improvements.
over $500,000 yearly, obtained from ad valorunt taxes on motor vehicles and
from gasoline taxes.(3) Benefit of trestle construction no longer goes to railroads through creation
of "feeders" which bring business to the railroads, but rather, the benefit goes
to the railroads' competitors.(4) There is a growing legislative trend toward relieving the railroads of
some or all of such costs.
" Mandamus was issued July 24, 1957, by Resident Judge Walter E. Johnston,
Jr., who found as fact that "the trestle of the defendant as now located constitutes
an unreasonable and dangerous interference with and will endanger and impede
and obstruct traffic on [the proposed street] . . . and constitutes a danger to the
traveling nublic for the City of Winston-Salem." Transcript of Record, p. 179,
Winston-Salem v. Southern Ry., 248 N.C. 637, 105 S.E.2d 37 (1958).
" N.C. CorsT. art. I, § 17.
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In the principal case, the court noted a lack of evidence that the
present underpass was dangerous to existing traffic at the underpass,
and in that respect distinguished it from cases based primarily on the
safety factor.20  It is admitted by the court that when the proposed
street is built it will have to narrow considerably in order to pass through
the existing trestle, and that in fact a hazardous situation will result at
this bottleneck. The court disposes of this rather summarily, however,
with the statement that "this situation of possible danger would be
entirely of the City's making in its attempt to eliminate traffic congestion,
originating principally in other areas of the City . . . ." (Emphasis
added.)21 The implication from such language is that the railroad
would not be held liable for the cost, even in the event that a hazardous
bottleneck subsequently occurs, so long as the situation is caused by
factors unconnected with the location and operation of the railroad.
The soundness of this implication should be considered in connection
with the three cases which follow.
In State ex rel. Minneapolis v. St. Paul, M. & M. Ry.,2 2 a somewhat
novel situation arose when the city constructed, at its own expense, a
new street and trestle through the railroad's embankment. The street
was designed as a thoroughfare (as in the principal case) manifestly to
aid the flow of traffic in other parts of the city. The trestle subsequently
burned and the city directed the railway, at its entire expense, to build
a new trestle. The court, in an elaborate decision, upheld the city's
power. 2
In Atlantic Coast Line R.R. v. Goldsboro,24 streets were laid out
subsequent to the existence of railroad tracks. The town graded the
streets parallel to the tracks, leaving the tracks six to eighteen inches
higher than the streets. The court upheld an ordinance requiring the
20 See, e.g., Durham v. Southern Ry., 185 N.C. 240, 117 S.E. 17 (1923), in
which mandamus was granted to enforce an ordinance requiring the railway to
separate a grade crossing and construct a street underpass at its entire expense
of $250,000, where the tracks were crossed by thousands of pedestrians and
motorists every day, several accidents had occured, and where traffic was obstructed
by trains and switching engines. Likewise, in Shreveport v. Kansas City, S. & G.
Ry., 167 La. 771, 120 So. 290 (1929), where the street underpass originally served
street traffic and one street car track; twenty years later there were two street
car tracks and barely room for two lanes of motorist traffic; the city's population
had doubled; and the underpass was a hazard, the railway was forced to rebuild
the underpass at its entire expense of $43,000.
21248 N.C. at 650, 105 S.E.2d at 46.
2298 Minn. 380, 108 N.W. 261 (1906), aff'd nem., 214 U.S. 497 (1909).
22 The underpass was said to be analogous to a grade crossing safety device,
the only difference being one of relative cost, and not of principle.Quaere: Assuming that the city under its charter has power to require rail-
roads to construct safety devices at crossings of new roads, could not the court
in the principal case have decided in favor of the city on the basis of this analogy?
Would the hesitance to accept such an analogy indicate that the objection was
one of principle, or of extra cost?2,155 N.C. 356, 71 S.E. 514 (1911), aff'd, 232 U.S.'548 (1914).
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railroad, at its entire expense, to lower the tracks in the interest of
public safety and convenience.
In Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. v. Public Util. Comn'n,25
the railroad, in 1914, constructed two adjoining street underpasses, the
principal uses of which were to give access to a garbage disposal plant.
The City of Los Angeles, in order to alleviate traffic conditions in other
parts of the city, subsequently (in the late 1940's) built a main thorough-
fare boulevard sixty feet wide which narrowed to twenty feet at the
underpasses, thereby causing a bottleneck. The Utilities Commission,
empowered by statute to allocate costs, required the railroad to pay
fifty per cent of the cost of reconstructing the underpasses. In affirming
the allocation, the United States Supreme Court said: "[T]he improve-
ments were instituted ... to meet local transportation needs and further
safety and convenience, made necessary by the rapid growth of the
communities. In such circumstances, this Court has consistently held
that in the exercise of the police power, the cost ...may be allocated
all to the railroads .... There is the proper limitation that such alloca-
tion of costs must be fair and reasonable." 26
In each of the latter three cases the railroad was held liable for at least
a proportionate part of the expense, notwithstanding that the hazards
and inconveniences were "entirely of the City's making."
Having ruled that public danger, either existing or prospective (as
a result of a probable bottleneck), has no bearing on this case, the court
states that this case is one of public convenience, designed to relieve
traffic congestion in other parts of the city; that where the location of
the railroad is not a reasonably related causative factor in producing
the inconvenience sought to be remedied, the railroad cannot be held
liable for the entire expense. The court would seem to restrict the
railroad's liability for public inconvenience to cases of traffic congestion
caused by the location of a particular grade crossing.27
It is important to note that there are cases of public convenience in
which no traffic congestion-indeed, no traffic--existed prior to the
construction of an underpass or overpass. These cases should be
compared to the principal case in that respect.
In Cincinnati, I. & W. Ry. v. City of Connersville,28 the city extended
"'346 U.S. 346 (1953). 28 Id. at 352.
"'For example, in one of the consolidated cases of Atchison, Topeka, & Santa
Fe Ry. v. Public Util. Conm'6, a grade crossing, often blocked by trains, caused a
considerable backlash of traffic; no danger was involved. The Court upheld the
commission order requiring the railroad to pay almost $750,000 (half of the total
cost) to construct an underpass so as to alleviate the inconvenience. Likewise,
in State ex tel. Wabash Ry. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 340 Mo. 225, 100 S.W.2d
522 (1936), the railroad was required to build an underpass, since the existing
grade crossing was causing delay, congestion, and general inconvenience to motorists
and pedestrians in a public park.2 218 U.S. 336 (1910).
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its city limits to include the railroad tracks, then constructed a new
street up to the railroad embankment and required the railroad to
provide, at its own expense, an underpass for the new street. The
United States Supreme Court upheld the action of the city.
In a later United States Supreme Court decision, Chicago, Milwaukee
& St. Paul Ry. v. Minneapolis,29 the railroad tracks were situated be-
tween two lakes used for recreation. The City of Minneapolis proposed
to connect the two lakes by means of a canal in order that pleasure boats
could pass from one lake to the other. The Court held that no consti-
tutional rights of the railroad had been violated by virtue of its being
required to build a bridge over the canal, at its entire expense, for the
convenience of passing boats. 80
It is submitted that the principal case cannot be distinguished from
cases cited in support of the plaintiff on the ground that the location of
the existing trestle does not cause public inconvenience; nor does the
court purport to distinguish the present case on such ground. Rather,
the court states: "The uncontroverted special facts shown in evidence
or of which the courts may take judicial notice, as herein pointed out,3 '
disclose changed economic conditions bearing favorably on the financial
condition of the City but unfavorably on that of the railway company,
and factually distinguish the instant case from the decisions cited by the
City and take the case out of the principles relied upon by it as authority
to sustain the validity of its ordinance. 'S2
Fifty years ago, trestle costs were not unfairly imposed on the rail-
roads, since in most cases they benefited directly by a reduction in tort
claims through the elimination of dangerous grade crossings,88 or in-
directly in that new roads acted as "feeders," transporting business to
and from the railroad.8 4 Even in cases where no benefit can be found, 8
there was no burden on the railroad, since the costs were easily passed
on to the ultimate consumers of rail-carried goods.
29 232 U.S. 430 (1914).
" The Court reiterated the rule set out in the Connersville case, stating: "It is
well settled that railroad corporations may be required, at their own expense,
not only to abolish existing grade crossings but also to build and maintain suitable
bridges or viaducts to carry highways, newly laid out, over their tracks ... (Emphasis added.) Id. at 438.
For the theory beh ind the holdings of the Connersville and Minneapolis cases,
see note 16, supra.
Note that the street underpass now in dispute in the principal case was
constructed by the railway in 1923, at its entire expense, pursuant to a resolution
by the city in order to make way for the new city street constructed up to the
railway's embankment; the railway apparently never questioned the fact that
such was its duty.
" See note 17 mupra.
32 248 N.C. at 655, 105 S.E.2d at 50.
" See, e.g., Erie R.R. v. Board of Pub. Util. Comm'rs, 254 U.S. 394 (1921).
:'See, e.g., Cincinnati, I. & W. Ry. v. City of Connersville, 218 U.S. 336 (1910).5 See, e.g., .Chicago, Milwaukee & St. Paul Ry. v. Minneapolis, 232 U.S. 430
(1914).
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Today the imposition of such costs is not always so fair and justifiable.
New streets which were once "feeders" for the benefit of the railroads
are now avenues of convenience for the benefit of the railroads' com-
petitors-the trucks and public carriers. Costs which once could be
passed to the public in the form of higher shipping rates must now be
absorbed by the railroads, since to raise rates would mean loss of busi-
ness to competitors.
It would seem that the North Carolina court is the first to apply the
dictum of Justice Brandeis, in Nashville, C. & St. L. Ry. v. Walters,386
which judicially recognizes the significance of the changing economic
position of the railroads brought about by increased competition.
Municipalities should take notice of the implications of the principal
case-that fairness of allocation of trestle construction costs on the rail-
road will in large part be determined by the present economic and
competitive positions of the railroads, including the relative economic
status of the railroad and municipality. Economic position, benefit 37 or
detriment, local necessity for the construction, and purpose of the con-
struction-all must be considered as factors in determining the reason-
ableness and fairness of the cost imposition. Apparently, then, munici-
palities will find little solace in precedent decisions which ignore such
considerations.38
Louis J. FISHER III
'e 294 U.S. 405 (1935). The Tennessee Supreme Court was held in error for
ruling that a police regulation requiring the railroad to pay 50% of the costs of
a new underpass was valid on its face, and that evidence of changed conditions
could not be admitted. The United States Supreme Court did not say that the
excluded evidence showed that the regulation was arbitrary or unreasonable, but only
that the evidence of changed conditions should be examined as possibly affecting
the reasonableness of the regulation. The excluded evidence showed that the
underpass proposed was not necessary nor requested by the rural community
of 1,823 inhabitants using the crossing; that the proposed highway was a link in
the federal interstate system which would manifestly further the convenience of
motor carriers in competition with the railrpad. Justices Stone arid Cardozo
dissented on the ground that even in view of all these facts the regulation could not
be held to be arbitrary or unreasonable.
For discussions-of the Nashville case, see Notes, 13 N.C.L. Rav. 491 (1935)
(predicting changes in railroad law), 23 CA-. L. REv. 631 (1935), 13 CHI.-KE-NT
L. REv. 262 (1935), 44 YAmL L.J. 1259 (1935).
Recognition of the change in economics and competition as discussed in the
Nashville case is found in dictum of Austin v. Shaw, 235 N.C. 722, 71 S.E.2d
25 (1952).
"' The principal case does not go so far as to hold that fairness depends solely
on benefit derived, though defendant sought this result. This theory was expressly
negated in the recent United States Supreme Court case of Atchison, Topeka &
Santa Fe Ry. v. Public Util. Comm'n, 346 U.S. 346 (1953).
88 Although the decision of the principal case was particularly favorable to the
railroads, it must not be assumed that the court protected the interest of railroads
at the expense of the public interest; it is more probable that the court recognized
that the best interest of the public lies in preventing the too-rapid decline of the
railroad industry.
As to the railroads' decline and effect on national economy and defense, see
25 ICC PRac. J. 836 (1958).
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